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SUPREME COURT OF ILLINOIS. 1
2
SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY.
SUPREME COURT COMMISSION OF OHIO.3
SUPREME COURT OF RHODE ISLAND.'
SUPREME COURT OF VERMONT. 5

ACTION.
Use of Property by Third Person necessarily injurious to Adjacent
Land.-An allegation that the defendant knowingly permitted a third
person to use the property of the defendant in a manner that was, per
se, injurious to the adjacent land of plaintiff; imputes an actionable wrong
to him: ToPf v. West Slore and Ont. Term. Co., 17 Yroom.
ADMIRALTY.
Limited Liability Act-Application, of to Injuries to Persons.-The
United States limited liability act of March 3,1851, in favor of ship
owners, etc., Revised Statutes U. S. §§ 4283-4285, applies to injury to
the person as well as to injury to property: Rounds v. Providence and
Stoninqton S. S. Co., 14 R. I.
The institution and prosecution of proceedings under Revised Statutes U. S. § 4285, in a District Court of the United States, followed by
a decree, is a bar to an action in this court to recover damages for personal injuries received in the marine collision which was the basis of
the proceedings in the District Court: Id.
AGENT.

Change of Principalin same Vegotiation-Evidence.-In a single undivided and continuous negotiation between A. and B., A. at one time
represented one principal and at another time a different one. EHeld,
that A. notwithstanding the change of principal was entitled to assume
that all statements of fact made to him by B. were repeated so long as
they were not corrected. The negotiation resulted in a written contract
signed by the parties. Held, that sthtements made by B. after the contract were inadmissible to show what influenced A.'s principal to sign
the contract, but were admissible to corroborate evidence as to what
statements B. made before the contract, it being admitted that B. before
and after the contract made statements as to the same matters and it
being shown that the subsequent statements were asked and given as a
repetition and confirmation of the preceding: Fuller v. Atwood, 14 R.I.
.Extentof Authority-From what it may be inferred.-A debtor apI From Hon. N. L. Freeman, Reporter; to appear in 110 Ill.
Rep.

2 From G. D. W. Vroom, Esq., Reporter; to appear in 17 Vroom Rep.
3 From E. L. DeWitt, Esq., Reporter; the cases will probably appear in 40 or
41 Ohio St. Rep.
4 From Arnold Green, Esq., Reporter; to appear in 14 R. I. Reports.
5 From Edwin T. Palmer, Esq., Reporter; to appear in 56 Vt. Rep.
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plied to an agent of his creditor for an extension of the time of payment or a renewal of the loan, the creditor being a non-resident corporation, and the agent a resident of the State, acting generally for the
creditor as to loans in this State. At the first interview the agent stated
to the debtor that he would communicate with the home office in regard
to the proposition made, and afterward such agent, in another interview,
said he was ready to enter into the arrangement that was thereupon
made: Held, that from these facts the debtor might properly infer
that the agent received the principal's sanction for entering into the
arrangement he made, and that the debtor was justified in his reliance
upon the agent's authority to make it: Union Mutual Life Ins. v. Slee,
110 Ill.
ARBITRATION.

Conduct of Hearings.-Underan agreement of arbitration by which
differences between A. and B. relative to certain premises were submitted
to two arbitrators who, if they could not ag ree, were to call in a third
and the decision of any two of the three was to be final; a third was
called in and of the three two of them in the absence of the other examined the premises and heard ex parte statements from B., A. not
being present and not having been notified; the third also examined
the premises alone and heard ex partestatements from B. in the absence
of A., and without notice to him, the information thus gained being influential in determining the award; and subsequently the three heard
exparte statements from A. in the absence of B. and without notice to
him. .Held, that the award was illegally made and null: 1. Because
the parties interested were not notified. 2. Because the arbitrators
did not act together: Wood v. Helme, 14 R. L
Cleland et al. v. Bedly, 5 R. I. 163, affirmed Id.
ATTORNEY.

Lien offor value of Services, and Disbursements.-An attorney has a
lien on money in his possession collected for his client, to secure a reasonable compensation for professional services and disbursements; and
he can retain enough of the money to pay the general balance due him
for such services and disbursements, although rendered in differentsuits;
and when the client has deceased before the rendition of judgment, the
lien secures charges for services performed for the intestate, as well as
those performed for his administrator, who has entered to prosecute:
.hurlbertv. Brigham, 56 Vt.
County not liablefor Fee of for defending Criminal by Appointment
of Court.-An attorney at law appointed by the court to defend one on a
trial of an indictment, and who does defend, is not entitled to recover of
the county in which the trial was had, any compensation for his services.
An attorney takes his license with its burdens, among which is, to defend persons charged with crime when required by the court: Johnson
v. ITtiteside County, 110 Ill.
CHARITY.

Gift to when not invalid because Indefinite.-Testamentary disposition as follows : " One quarter part of my trust property to be given to
educational institutions similar to those mentioned in article thirteen,
and the remaining quarter part of my trust property to be given to
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charitable institutions similar to those mentioned in article thirteen."
.eld, not to be invalid simply because indefinite : Rhode Island fHospital Trust Co. v: Olney, 14 R. L
CONFLICT OF LAws.
CONTRACT.

See Surety.

See Corporation; Mechanics' Lien.
CORPORATION.

Effect of Publication by Directors that they and the Stockholders
are PersonallyLiable- Contract-Deceit.-The publication by savings
bank directors that " directors and stockholders are personally responsible for its debts," does not constitute a contract with those who may
make deposits; but if the statement is false it lays the foundation fox
an action for deceit; Westervelt v. Demarest, 17 Yroom.
CRIMINAL LAW.
See Attorney.
Offence Committed on Border line between Counties.-There is a
class of offences that may be committed by a party being in one county,
upon a person or thing being at the same time in another county, when
the offence may not inaptly be defined as having been committed in
either county; and offences committed on the county line, or so near
thereto as that the distance therefrom is inappreciable, may with propriety be regarded as having been committed in either county, and by
doing so no one is deprived of any constitutional right: Bucl,-rice v. The
People, 110 Ill.

Credibility of Defendant testifying in his own behalf, how determined.-On the trial of three defendants for larceny, the court instructed
the jury " that in this state the accused is permitted to testify in his
own behalf; that when he does so testify he at once becomes the same
as any other witness, and his credibility is to be tested by and subjected
to the same tests as are legally applied to any other witness; and in
determining the degree of credibility that shall be accorded to his testimony, the jury have the right to take into consideration the fact that
he is interested in the result of his prosecution, as well as his demeanor
and conduct upon the witness stand and during the trial ; and the jury
are also to take into consideration the fact, if such is the fact, that he
has been contradicted by other witnesses. And the court further
instructs tbe-jury, that if, after considering all the evidence in this case,
they find that the accused have wilfully testified falsely to any fact
material to the issue in this case, they have the right to entirely disregard his testimony, excepting in so far as his testimony is corroborated
by other credible evidence."
Held, that there was no substantial
objection to the instruction : Rider v. The People, 110 Ill.
Whatever may be the rule in other states with respect to the right of
a jury to convict upon the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice,
it is well settled that the right exists here, and convictions on such
testimony will not be disturbed by this court on that ground alone: Id.
Indecent EJxposure-1
What Publicity N ecessary.-The crime of indecent exposure is committed if a person intentionally makes such exposure
in the view from the windows of two neighboring dwelling-houses:
Van Houten v. State, 17 Yroom.

ABSTRACTS OF RECENT DECISIONS.

617

It is not necessary that any person should actually see such exposure
if it was made in a public place with the intent that it should be seen,
and persons were there who could have seen it if they had looked : Id.
DAMAGES.
Measure of for Delay in Manufacture of Books.-On a failure to
complete the work on books, and deliver the same within the time
agreed upon, it is not admissible to prove, on the question of damages,
from the delay, that there may have been a demand for the books had
they been ready at the proper time. If the party for whom the books
were manufactured had made sales of books, and suffered a loss of profits
thereon in consequence of the delay in completing the work, evidence
of such facts would be competent on the question of damages: Bill et
al. v. Parsonset al., 110 Ill.
DEBTOR AND CREDITOR.

Transfer of Stock in Fraud of Oreditor-Remedy-Equit.-In
ease of a transfer of corporate stock made with intent to hinder, delay
void
and defraud creditors : field, that such transfer is 14
R. as. against such
v. Burrough,
creditors at common law: Beckwith
A. transferred certain corporate stock in fraud of his creditors. It
was subsequently attached as the property of A., and after judgment
against A. sold on execution. The purchaser filed a bill in equity to
obtain the stock. field, that the shares of stock were liable to attachment and execution sale as the property of A. notwithstanding the
Held, further, that the bill in
prior fraudulent transfer by him.
equity should be maintained, the complainant having no adequate
remedy at law if any: 1d.
DECEIT.
DEED.

See Corporation.

See Easement; Notice.
EASEMENT.

Constructionof Clause in Deed reserving.-H. in 1848 owned both
the plaintiff's and defendant's premises. The deed conveying the plaintiff's contained this clause: "Said sixteen feet [east] of said house to
be kept open as far back as the south end of said house." The defendant claimed a right of way, by reason of said reservation, and also by
prescription. Held, that a right of way was not reserved; that the
clause is applicable to other matters, such as obstructing light, air or
Wilder v. Wheeldon, 56 Vt.
the view :
EQUITY.

See Debtor and Creditor; Mortgage.

Reversal of Decree does not affect Title of Purchaser before Apeal.
-Where the title of a husband in real estate is, by a decree on bill to
enforce a trust or specific agreement, vested in the wife, and before appeal or writ of error to reverse the decree the wife sells the property to
a third person, in good faith, who pays a part of the price and secures
the balance by mortgage on the premises, and the trustee holding for
the wife conveys to such purchaser in pursuance of such decree, the
title of the purchaser cannot be defeated by a reversal of the decree
for error, it'the court rendering it had jurisdiction of the subject-mat
VoL. XXXIL-78
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ter and of the persons of the parties in interest: Eannas v. Yannas,
110 I11.
EVIDENCE.
See Agent.
Abstract of Title-Secondary Evidence of Contents of.-Where original evidence, such as a deed or other instrument, is lost or destroyed,
secondary evidence may be introduced to prove its contents. But an
abstract of title of real estate cannot be regarded as original evidence.
It is but secondary evidence itself, and therefore its contents cannot be
proven by other evidence in case of loss or destruction; Thatcher v.
Olmstead, 110 Ill.
FRAUDS, STATUTE OF.

Parol Agreement to Convey a Lot for Church purposes- What will
take the Case out of the Statute-Laches.--In pursuance of a verbal
agreement of the owner of a lot of ground, to convey the same when a
building should be erected thereon, and dedicated to religious worship,
and the society incorporated, a subscription was raised, and the money
so procured was expended in the erection of the building. It was held,
that such expenditure was tantamount to the payment of the consideration, which, in connection with the taking of possession and making
improvements, took the case out of the Statute of Trauds : Whitsitt v.
Trustees Presbyterian Church, 110 Ill.
Laches is not available as a defence to a bill for the specific performance of an agreement to convey land, where the complainant has been
in the continued possession of the premises: Id.
GiFT.
Inter Vivos-Trust.-B., the plaintiff's executor, deposited $800 in the
defendant savings bank in the name of 0. but payable to himself. He took
a deposit book, which he kept and controlled. He withdrew a little more
than half of it, and in a few months directed the treasurer of the bank to
add to the first entry, "Payable to S. Barlow," so as to make it read,
"Payable to S. Barlow, during his life and after his death to Marion
Cushing." B. made his will before the deposit, in which was this provision: "I hereby confirm all gifts I have made or shall make to any
of my children." C. was a grandchild. It did not appear that B. did
or said anything else in relation to the deposit, or that indicated an intention to hold the pass book in trust for 0. A by-law printed in the
pass book provided that no deposit could be withdrawn without the production of the book. The bank had no communication with C., and
understood that B. was the depositor, and so treated him. C. had no
knowledge of the transaction. Beld, 1. There was no delivery, no acceptance, and therefore the deposit could not be sustained as a gift inter
vivos; 2. The bank did not hold the money as trustee for 0.; 8. The
donor did not declare himself a trustee, and did nothing equivalent to
that; hence, there was no trust relation between him and the claimant:
.Pcope v. The Burlington Savings Bank, 56 Vt.
HIGHWAY.
See Municipal Corporation.
INJUNCTION.

When Defendant on Dissolution can recover no greater Damage than
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Penalty of Bond.-On the dissolution of an injunction granted on condition that a bond of a specified amount be filed, and the bond was
filed, with no other order as to payment of damages, which might result
from granting the injunction, the defendant can recover no greater
amount than the penalty of the bond. If the injunction had issued,
conditioned that the orators pay all the damages sustained, the case
might merit a different conclusion : Selectmen of Glover v. .XeGaffey,
56 Vt.
INSURANCE.

Pafyment of Premium after Death of Assured.-A person whose life
was insured, on demand refused to pay the second annual premium, and
died in about ten days after default in payment. Two days after the
death, a subordinate agent of the company, and friend of the assured,
being ignorant of his death, paid the premium, taking the insurance
company's receipt renewing the policy. On learning of the death of the
assured, the friend returned the receipt to the company and it returned
the money paid by him. Held, that the payment by such friend, which
was made and received -by the company in ignorance of the fact of the
death of the assured, could then amount to nothing, and that the party
to whom the policy was payable acquired no rights thereby: Miller v.
Union Ceantral LfifeIns. Co., 110 Ill.
See Partnershp.

LANDLORD AND TENANT.

LIEN.

See Attorney.

LIMITATIONS, STATUTE OF.
MANDAMUS.

See Mortgage; Surety.

See .Municipal Corporation.

MECHANICS' LIEN.

Assignment of Contract and Lien-How enforeed.-A. by special
contract made July 29th 1880, engaged to build a house for B. December 1st 1880, A. assigned the contract to C. At the time of the
assignment A. bad taken no steps to secure a mechanic's lien. B. consented that 0. should proceed under the contract and finish the house.
Held, that B.'s consent to C.'s proceeding under the contract was a consent to the transfer of the contract to C. Held, further, that C. was
entitled to perfect and enforce a mechanic's lien, using the name of the
assignors. Held, further, that a mechanic's lien though inchoate is
assignable, passing in equity with the debt or contract for which it is
security: McDonald v. Kelly, 14 R. I.
It not appearing that C. entered into any contract with B., or that
A. was ever released by B., Held, that 0. proceeded properly in using
the name of A.: Id.
MORTGAGE.

Claimfor Amount unpaid by Foreclosure~- sury-iSet-off-Euity.
-When a mortgage has been foreclosed, and the premises are not worth
enough to pay the mortgage debt, the excess may be pleaded as an
equitable offset; and, the mortgage having been executed to both the
orators, but the usury having been paid to one of theni for the benefit
of both; the mortgage notes having been sold and merged in a judg-
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ment in the natie of a third party, and then repurchased by the orators,
and the mortgage foreclosed by them and in their names ; an action at
law having beed brought to recover the usury against the party alone
to whom the usury had been paid, and hence the excess could not at
law be pleaded in offset. Held, that a bill in equity would lie to compel
an equitable offset, the mortgagor being insolvent: Smith v. McDonald,
50 Vt.
Effect on Remedy under, of Running of Statute of Limitations on
Mortgage Note.r-The remedy on a mortgage is not lost because a personal action on the mortgage note is barred by the Statute of Limitations. The remedy on the mortgage is generally available until payment
of the note is shown or may be presumed, or until the mortgagor has
remained in possession for twenty years without recognising the mortgage: Ballou.v. Taylor, 14 R. I.
See Attorney.
Sections
Oficers-Inconsistent
of
Terms
of
Ordinance as to Duration
in Ordinance.-The provisions of a city charter as to duration of terms
of officers must be strictly observed, and an ordinance beyond the scope
of the powers granted by the charter is void: State v. The Mayor and
Common Council of Newark, 17 Vroom.
The whole of an ordinance is not necessarily inoperative because some
of its sections are inconsistent. A section not dependent on the inconsistent sections may stand: Id.
Distinction between Ordinance and Resolution-Mandamus.-W here
a charter of a municipal corporation requires a proceeding to be instituted by an ordinance, it cannot be effected by a resolution merely, the
latter being wanting in the solemnities of the former, and is not regarded
as a legal equivalent : State v. Barnet, 17 Vroom.
The charter of the city of Paterson provides that any legislative act
of the board of aldermen shall be by ordinance passed by a vote of a
majority of its members, and in case an ordinance involves the expenditure of money, the votes of two-thirds of the members of the board shall
be necessary to its passage. The board of aldermen, by resolution,
directed the construction of certain sewers and drains, and passed an
ordinance for the issue of bonds to pay for the 'same; the mayor of the
city declined to sign the bonds thus ordered to be issued. Held, 1. That
the act of the board of aldermen was legislative in its character, and
could not be effected by resolution; 2. The mayor will not be compelled
by mandamus to do an act against his objection in furtherance of a
measure having its inception without legal authority and in violation of
the charter provisions: Id.
Clerk of in charge of Records- Certiorari.-When a municipal corporation has a clerk whose duty by law is to keep the records thereof,
unless council otherwise direct, such officer is the mere agent of the
corporation, and his custody is that of the corporation. The municipal
corporation is, therefore, in legal contemplation, the custodian of such
records, and a writ of certiorarito bring up such records is properly directed to it. A return under its direction by such officer is correctly
made: State v. Town of Harrison,17 Vroom.
Responsibility of for Street partially occupied by Railroad.-In
MUNICIPAX

CORPORATION.
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1853, the city council of the city of Steubenville, by ordinance, authorizced a railroad company to lay one main track and one side track in a
street, the tracks to be parallel with the west line of the street, and the
centre of the western track to be forty feet from said west line of the
street The city reserved the right to require the company to cover
any portion of the superstructure, except the rail, with suitable plank
in such manner as the council should prescribe, and also to require the
company to light said railroad with gas in such manner as the council
should prescribe. The company made and left open a ditch between its
tracks. This being unlighted at night, M., without fault on his part,
fell into the ditch and suffered serious injury. He sued the city. The
answer pleaded the said ordinance as relieving the city from responsibility for so much of the street as was occupied by, and lay between,
the tracks, averring "that the place where the plaintiff fell had not
been used, maintained or kept up as a street or highway since the said
railroad tracks were constructed, and was in the exclusive possession
and use of said railroad company. That the space between said main
track of said railroad and the west line of said Water street has been
kept open and in proper repair as a street, and furnished ample facilities
for the passage of any and all persons who had, or might have, occasion
to use it as a street." The trial court sustained a demurrer to this
answer, and the plaintiff recovered a verdict and judgment. .eld, the
city's supervision of, and responsibility for, the street, subject only to
the use by the company as granted, continued ; and the answer was insufficient: City of Steubenville v. Me Gill, 40 or 41 Ohio St.
Res~onsibilityfor _Negligence of Superintendent of Public Cemetery.The principle of respondeat superior applies to municipal corporations,
where the acts of their servants or agents refer to powers and duties
ministerial in their nature and character. A city organized under the
laws of Ohio, held the title to and the right of possession of a public
cemetery located within its limits, which was under the management,
control and regulation of a board of cemetery trustees, chosen by the
electors of the corporation and removable for cause by the city council.
An employee while engaged in the cemetery in improving a vault owned
by the city, was injured through the carelessness and want of skill of
the superintendent of the cemetery, and the negligence of the trustees.
The employee worked .under and obeyed the orders and directions of the
superintendent, and both received their appointment from the board of
trustees, subject to the approval of the council. feld, that the city was
liable for the injuries resulting to the employee: City of Toledo v. Cone,
40 or 41 Ohio St.
Liabilityfor Defect in Highway.-An incorporated village is not
liable for an injury caused by a defect in a street crossing, when the
charter does not impose upon the village the legal duty of keeping the
highways in repair. And such duty is not imposed by the acceptance
of a charter which merely allowed the village, as a volunteer, to take
supervision of the highways, the town never having surrendered the
right of control over them, nor having been released from its obligation
to repair : Parker v. The Village of Rutland, 56 Vt.
See llunicipal Cororation; Railroad; Street.
Comparatic and Contributory.-If a plaintiff who is injured at a
NEGLIGEN-CE.
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highway crossing by a railway train does omit some slight precaution
for his safety, and the railway company omits all care on its part, the
plaintiff will not be without remedy. If the plaintiff's negligence is
slight, and that of the company, when compared with that of the plaintiff is gross, a recovery may be had: Wabash, St. L. and P. R. Co.
v. Wallace, 110 Ill.
NOTICE.
Unrecorded Deed- What si.ficient to put on lnAguiry.-In an action
of ejectment the contention was over a division line, and this turned on
the question whether the defendant was chargeable with notice of the
contents of an unrecorded deed when he knew of the deed but not its
terms. f1eld, that the defendant was put on inquiry, and that having
notice of the deed he was bound by all its contents. This decision is
not in conflict with Brackett v. Wait, 6 Vt. 411: . ill v. Murray,
56 Vt.
OFFICE.

See Municipal Corporation; Certiorari.

ORDINANCE.

See .Municpal Corporation.
PARTNERSHIP.

Lease-Dissolution-cPacment by one Partnerfor release- Contribution.-C. and M., partners, held as joint lessees a lease of certain
premises for ninety-nine years, renewable forever, with covenants for
payment of rent, taxes and assessments. The partnership was dissolved, and (3. conveyed to 3I1. all his undivided interest in the leasehold. The assignee of the reversion brought suit on the covenants for
ren t against C. and M. jointly, for arrears of rent accrued after the
dissolution of the partnership. Pending the suit, M. being'in default
of answer, C. filed an answer denying all liability for rent, but afterwards paid to the assignee of the reversion the sum of $500, who, in
consideration thereof, negotiated and executed to him a release from all
and any liability arising on or growing out of the lease, and forever
discharged him from all and any covenants therein and from all obligations thereof. Held, 1. There is not such a presumption that the
above-named sum was paid on accrued rent, and not in discharge of
future contingent liability on the lease as would entitle C. to recover
such sum of MI. as money paid for and on his account upon an implied
promise to reimburse 0. therefor. 2. The burden is not on M. to prove
that such sum was not applied on the rent: McHenry v. Carson, 40 or
41 Ohio St.
PATENT. See Trademark.
PAYMENT.

By Stranper-Consideration.-Satisfaction of a debt made by a
stranger for or on account of the debtor and adopted by the debtor, is a
valid satisfaction: Bennett v. Hill, 14 R. I.
The debtor need not formally adopt such satisfaction before availing
himself of it by plea, the plea being an adoption: Id.
A. being indebted to C., an agreement was made between B. and 0.
by which A. and B. were to carry on a business formerly owned by C.;
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and B. was from the profits to pay C. the debt due from A. while 0. was

to accept the agreement in lieu of his claim against A. ileld, that the
agreement discharged A. from C.'s claim. Held, further, that the discharge of C.'s claim was a sufficient consideration for the agreement and
for ].'s promise: 11.
PLEADING.

Joinder of Claimsfor Tort and Breach of Contract-Election.-The
petition asked damages for horses killed by defendant's train, and
counted upon two distinct wrongful acts as causes of the killing: first,
neglect to keep in repair a fence as required by contract; and second,
negligence in running the train. A motion to require plaintiff to
elect whether he would rely upon the breach of contract or the tort was
overruled. Held, the doctrine of election applies where one wrongful
act is charged, and the plaintiff is entitled to treat it as having either of
two natures. But the addition of a tort to a separate and distinct act
in violation of contract, does not deprive the injured party of the right
to complain, at the same time, of both wrongs. Of course he cannot
recover double damages: P., 0. & St. L. Railway Co. v. -Hedges,40 or
41 Ohio St.
PRACTICE.

.Adjournment of Cause.-When a cause in the court for the trial of
small causes has been adjourned to a particular time and place, and the
justice fails to attend, but, at another place, in the absence of the
parties and withoitt the consent of the defendant, adjourns the cause to
another day, he cannot, on that day, proceed to trial and judgment,
although notice of the adjournment has been given defendant. Such
an adjournment operates as a discontinuance of the suit: State v. Summit Board of Health, 17 Vroom.

Quo WARRANTO.
Discretion in Granting,at Instanceof Private Relator.-The granting
or withholding leave to file an information in the nature of a quo warranto, at the instance of a private relator, to test the right to an office,
rests in the sound discretion of the court, even though there be a substantial defect in the title by which the office is held ; thus, the court
dismissed a complaint upon the relation of a private person, praying for
leave to file an information against the defendant, a school committee,
or acting as such, independently of the alleged defect of the committee's title; and this on the ground that he was eligible to the office
and competent; that he had hired teachers in good faith and made
provision for a school; that it was an annual office without emoluinents : and that the best interests of the district required that he
should be allowed to continue through his term: State v. .ead, 56 Vt.
RAILROAD.
Rewponsibility of for Accident when wrongful Act of Stranger intervenes.-A railroad company left a loaded car, coupled with two empty
cars, standing on a switch which inclined towards their main track, the
same being secured by their brakes and a railroad tie placed under
the wheels of the loaded car ; the cars got upon the main track and
an accident occurred, the plaintiff being injured, fEeld, the company
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was not irresponsible, as a matter of law, even though the cars could
not have got on the main track but for the wrongful act of a stranger:
Smith v. New York, S. and W. R. R. Co., 17 Yroom.
SET-OFF.

See -Mortgage.

STREET.
See Municipal Corporation.
Liability of Owner of Land adjacentto.-The owner of land adjacent to a street of a city is not liable for an injury resulting from the
unsafe or dangerous condition of the land, where the person injured left
the street and went upon the adjacent land without the knowledge and
without any inducement from the owner or occupant thereof, and without invitation, express or implied : .Kelly v. City of Columbus, 40 or 41
Ohio St.
The fact that the pavement was continuous from the sidewalk, over
the adjacent land to the place of danger, was not, of itself, an implied
invitation to a person on the pavement to go upon the adjacent lands: Id.
SURETY.

Statute of Limitations- Conflict of Laws- Contribution.-Theplaintiff and defendant were co-sureties on a promissory note. All the parties to the note, the payee, the principal, and sureties were residents of
this state. After the Statute of Limitations became a bar here, the
Splaintiff voluntarily and without the knowledge of the defendant, but
with no fraudulent intent, went to New Hampshire, where there was no
defence to the note, and there was sued by the payee, judgment rendered
against him, and he was compelled to pay. Held, in an action for contribution, that the payment was compulsory, and not voluntary, and
that the defendant was liable: Aldrich v. Aldrich, 56 Vt.
The legal right of sureties as against each other is not governed by
the lex loci contractus; nether is there any implied obligation that they
shall reside in any particular locality: Id.
TRuST AND TRUSTEE.

See Gift.

TRADEMARK.

Patented Miachine on which Patent has expired.-Where a patented
machine becomes known to the public, by a distinctive name during the
existence of the patent, any one at the expiration of the patent may
make and vend such machines, and use such name; and no one, by incorporating such name into his trade mark, can take away from the public the right of so using it: Brill v. Singer Manufacturing Co., 40 or 41
Ohio St.
Where machines, during the time they are protected by a patent,
become known and identified in the trade by their mechanism, shape,
external appearance or ornamentation, the patentee, after the expiration
of the patent, cannot prevent others from using the same modes of
identification, in machines of the same kind manufactured and sold by
them: Id.

